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International ﬁnancial markets are said to be excessively volatile due
to destabilizing speculation and excessive market volume. Transac-
tions taxes might help. From studying the literature we conclude that
there must be an optimal market liquidity, which minimizes excess
volatility. There are two eﬀects when imposing a transactions tax.
Both reduce excess volatility in highly speculative markets when tax
rates are small. The total tax eﬀect then is unambiguous. However,
in illiquid markets the tax might raise volatility.
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II1 Introduction
As the elections of the German Parliament in 2002 were approaching, there
was a widespread discussion about globalization and its discontents. Not
only it was on the agenda in Germany but also in the rest of the western
world, leading to parliamentary resolutions in Canada and France about tax-
ing foreign exchange transactions to stabilize international ﬁnancial markets.
But the idea of a government intervention through transactions taxes did not
arise in this decade. Already John Maynard Keynes in his General Theory
from 1936 suggests in chapter 12 to mitigate the dominance of speculative
and destabilizing speculation on ﬁnancial markets by a Government transfer
tax.
James Tobin (1978) put Keynes suggestion in concrete terms by propos-
ing a small tax on all foreign exchange transactions. Stiglitz (1989) and
Summers/Summers (1989) think of a securities transactions tax in order to
raise the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial markets by crowding out market participants
that behave not rationally or waste too much resources for this speculative
zero-sum game. Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz renew the case for sand in
the wheels of international ﬁnance in 1995.
What all of the proposals have in common is that a transactions tax is to
be enhancing market eﬃciency. We will concentrate on the ability of the tax
to bring back the price to its fundamental value and to lower excess volatil-
ity respectively. Its proof seems to be controversial since the literature does
not provide theoretical models explaining real stock prices or exchange rates
satisfactory. Moreover, especially for foreign exchange it is diﬃcult or even
1impossible to determine a fundamental price.
This paper oﬀers some evidence from the literature that a transactions tax
might reduce excess volatility when markets are highly speculative. Illiquid
non-speculative markets might be faced with a perverse eﬀect. Or to say
it in diﬀerent words, our work examines the circumstances, under which a
transactions tax might be desirable. The idea is not to determine the fun-
damental value explicitly but to detect factors that drive prices away from
a desirable value according to its underlyings. Since such a tax reduces the
trading volume, we try to delineate a volatility-volume pattern and analyze
the potential outcome of a tax levy.
In a ﬁrst step, we derive a concept of market eﬃciency, in which excess
volatility means ineﬃciency (section 2). We than work out the connection
between excess volatility and market liquidity in section 3 before examin-
ing the eﬀects of a transactions tax (section 4). Section 5 summarizes and
concludes.
2 Eﬃciency of Financial Markets: Fama vs.
Tobin
A Government Intervention, in our case the imposition of a transactions tax
on ﬁnancial markets, can be justiﬁed by improving the eﬃciency of the ﬁ-
nancial system or justice. The most common concept of assessing the market
2eﬃciency is that of Cowles (1933) and Fama (1970)1. This market eﬃciency
hypothesis values the ability of the market mechanism of incorporating news.
One can distinguish between three forms of market eﬃciency according to the
kind of information reﬂected in price movements. The weak form contains
past prices or returns; the semi-strong form contains public information in
addition; and in the sense of the strong form insider-information is to de-
termine the market price additionally. Thus, in a perfectly eﬃcient market
prices incorporate news instantaneously leading to jumps in market prices
without the necessity of trading volume.
The aim of implementing a transactions tax is reducing excess volatility in
order to raise the market eﬃciency. Excess volatility normally is understood
as the portion of price variability that can not be explained by changes in
fundamental data.
The concept of the information arbitrage eﬃciency explained above can not
be used to assess the eﬀect of a transactions tax, because excess volatility
need not necessarily be ineﬃcient. Some fraction of information available is
pseudo-signal or news containing wrong leading information. Thus, an infor-
mation arbitrage eﬃcient market that incorporates these information in its
prices makes them drift away from desirable prices based on fundamentals.
One solution might be using implied volatility, which measures only not ex-
pected price changes. This concept goes back to Engle’s (1982) ARCH-Model
and the GARCH-Model of Bollerslev (1986)2.
1See also Gaab (1983).
2More about estimating implied volatilities in Specht (2000).
3Tobin (1987) oﬀers a broader view of market eﬃciency3. In addition to the
information arbitrage eﬃciency he distinguishes between three more concepts
of eﬃciency: Fundamental valuation eﬃciency, full insurance eﬃciency, and
functional eﬃciency. ”A market in a ﬁnancial asset is eﬃcient if its valua-
tions reﬂect accurately the future payments to which the asset gives title -
to use currently fashionable jargon, if the price of the asset is based on ra-
tional expectations of those payments.”4 Eﬃciency in this meaning he calls
fundamental valuation eﬃciency. In this context excess volatility means in-
eﬃciency, and a transactions tax that lowers excess volatility contributes to
a more eﬃcient market. In the following, we will use this concept of mar-
ket eﬃciency for our analysis. And since the ﬁndings of Shiller (1981) and
LeRoy/Porter (1981) regarding stock markets and Shiller (1979) relating to
bond markets we know about the existence of excess volatility in this sense5.
3 Excess Volatility and Market Liquidity
This section provides some evidence that there exists an optimal degree of
liquidity. Some advocates of a securities transactions tax on ﬁnancial markets
point out to the danger of illiquid markets. ”The logic of Keynes’s liquidity
preference theory is that the primary function of ﬁnancial markets is to pro-
vide liquidity for asset holders. Since a liquid market must be an orderly one,
rules and institutions must be developed to guarantee orderliness.”6 Thus,
a transactions tax is a double-edged sword, since it cuts desirable liquidity
3See also Tobin (1984).
4See Tobin (1987), paperback edition 1989, page 283.
5A survey of market volatility is oﬀered by Shiller (1991). See also Cochrane (1991).
6In Davidson (2002), page 181.
4also. In his model Frankel (1996) shows how a transactions tax discriminates
destabilizing short-term speculation but at the same time warns about higher
bis-ask spreads. Arestis and Sawyer (1998) model this trade-oﬀ by stabiliz-
ing and destabilizing components of exchange rate determination. Without
mentioning it there must me an optimal liquidity.
In this section we try to delineate a pattern in the excess volatility-liquidity
range. First, we describe the excess volatility-liquidity connection in the
case of fully rational and completely informed market participants before
introducing price misguidance due to irrational noise-traders, bubbles etc..
The total eﬀect than generates a certain degree of liquidity, for which excess
volatility is minimized.
3.1 The Liquidity Eﬀect under Eﬃcient Market
Microstructure
The analysis in this subsection ”is based on the hypothesis that market par-
ticipants are both fully rational and completely informed about the structure
of the model and the behavior of relevant [.] fundamentals.”7 The easiest
assumption is that all market participants are homogenous. We call this
eﬃcient market microstructure. But in contrast to the eﬃcient information
arbitrage hypothesis prices do not jump instantaneously into new equilib-
rium but follow an approximation path. This is because participants do not
know about the expectations of others. Thus, market liquidity enhances the
approach to equilibrium. This meets the old Wall Street adage that it takes
7See Isard (1995), page 182.
5volume to move prices. Moreover, customer orders e.g. due to international
trade and hedging provide market volume. What follows is an analysis of
excess volatility when market liquidity varies, ceteris paribus. Before, we
want to clarify the expressions market liquidity and excess volatility.
Market Liquidity:
Market liquidity is the ability of the market to change assets into money (or
other assets respectively) according to the time it takes and to transaction
costs. Two market features are positively related to this ability, namely the
frequency of transactions and market volume. That is, every market modiﬁ-
cation or government intervention that reduces the frequency of transactions
or market volume lowers market liquidity.
Excess Volatility:
Excess volatility is that share of price variability that can not be justiﬁed
by changes in fundamental values. In our case excess volatility is all kind
of drift oﬀ the fundamental equilibrium price. In a world with an eﬃcient
market microstructure as deﬁned above the fundamental value is known, and
any deviation is regarded as excess volatility.
From the remarks above it is already clear that excess volatility decreases
with increasing liquidity. Since in this framework liquidity is the only factor
that inﬂuences the price concerning its walk to equilibrium, the deviation
from its fundamental value and thus excess volatility diminishes with higher
liquidity8.
8Note that we assume homogenous traders so that the equilibrium price is unambigu-
ous. If there were bulls and bears in the market, the price would depend on which group



















Figure 3.1: The Liquidity Eﬀect under Eﬃcient Market Microstructure.
There exist some other rationales. Davidson (2002) oﬀers the ﬁrst. The
framework is that of an eﬃcient market microstructure as stated above, and
all homogenous participants are completely informed about the behavior of
fundamentals except a random white noise. Thus, in addition to the di-
vergence explained above, there exists a variance around the average that is
determined by fundamentals, which can be attributed to random white noise.
Reducing transaction costs is equivalent to lowering the admission price for
participation. This widens the broadness of the market or volume (liquidity)
respectively. ”[.] in an eﬃcient market, the larger the number of homoge-
neous participants, the smaller the variance, since variance has the property
of being inversely related to the size of a random unbiased sample. In the
mine the equilibrium price explicitly but only the deviations (excess volatility) from this
reasonable ﬂuctuation margin.
7long run as irrational traders are made extinct by an eﬃcient market, the
remaining sample will be unbiased and volume and variance will be inversely
related.”9
The framework in Pagano (1989) is that of rational investors, which are af-
fected by an initial endowment shock. He shows that the variance of the
market price is a decreasing function of the number of traders10.
In ﬁgure 3.1 the graph XX fulﬁlls the requirement of inverse relationship
and approaches to zero at high liquidity levels. Of course, the prove of the
exact proﬁle remains outstanding.
Umlauf (1993) using Swedish data and Jones/Seguin (1997) oﬀer empirical
evidence. Jones and Seguin examine the eﬀect of transaction costs on the
New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange in 1975. Both
investigations detect an inverse relationship between transaction costs and
volatility. Umlauf ﬁnds that daily variances were highest during the pe-
riod of greatest transactions costs due to a transactions tax. In addition,
Jones/Seguin (1997) as well as Campbell/Froot (1994) explicitly show an
increase in volume due to lower transaction costs.
Transaction costs in the foreign exchange market are implicit and its estima-
tion normally is based on the bis-ask spread quoted by banks to commercial
or non-bank customers. However, in order to avoid methodological ﬂaws,
Aliber/Chowdhry/Yan (2003) use future prices to implicitly measure trans-
action costs. Their empirical ﬁndings suggest that volatility is positively
correlated with the level of transaction costs and that volume is inversely re-
9See Davidson (2002), page 191.
10See therein page 276.
8lated with the level of transaction costs. That is, an increase in transaction
costs, e.g. through a tax imposition, leads to a reduction in market volume
and increases volatility. Thus, there is strong evidence that liquidity and
excess volatility are negatively associated.
Investors liquidity preference oﬀers another rational. Investors view liquidity
as a desirable quality. Thus, the liquidity premium component of required
rates of return rises when the market liquidity diminishes11. To say it in
other words, the discount rate increases. Therefore, the asset price shifts
away from its fundamental value12.
3.2 The Liquidity Eﬀect under Misguidance
Bernstein (1999) argues that the eﬃcient market theory can not be the rel-
evant theory for the world in which we live. He states, that ”a market can
never be eﬃcient unless equilibrium prices exist and are known. Equilibrium
prices are impossible in a dynamic and restless world [...].”13 The conclusion
would be that we are not able to determine excess volatility, which we use
here as the measure of market ineﬃciency. But what we want to do in this
paper is not determine excess volatility explicitly. The aim of our analysis is
to detect factors that drive eﬃciency or ineﬃciency respectively. We do not
have to know the fundamental equilibrium price explicitly to ﬁnd out that
lacking liquidity e.g. leads to higher volatility, which cannot be explained by
11See Kupiec (1995).
12If the liquidity is cut due to a transactions tax, Kupiec (1995) shows that there will
be price movements that more than oﬀset the increased liquidity premium eﬀect.




















Figure 3.2: The Liquidity Eﬀect under Misguidance.
fundamental market data (section 3.1).
In this subsection we allow for heterogeneous market participants with diﬀer-
ent expectations and forecasting techniques14, bubbles due to herd behavior15
and bandwagon eﬀects16, chaos17 and externalities18. As we will see, this in-
eﬃcient market microstructure combined with market liquidity misguides the
price from its intrinsic value.
14See for example Frankel/Froot (1990b).
15See therefore Banerjee (1992) and Shiller (1995).
16Examined in Cutler/Poterba/Summers (1990).
17See De Grauwe/Dewachter/Embrechts (1994).
18In Summers/Summers (1989), too much resources are wasted owing to rent seek-
ing, and the behavior of noise-traders generate additional market risk as modelled in
DeLong/Shleifer/Summers/Waldmann (1990).
10Misguidance:
Misguidance is to be understood as ineﬃcient market structure or market
reaction. In contrast to section 3.1 the market does not ﬁnd the market
price according to its fundamental value. In the following, we concentrate on
misguidance explained by the microstructure approach19, although other ap-
proaches regarding political surprises, learning, and macroeconomic shocks
and crises try to explain price movements in ﬁnancial markets, too.20
One important ﬁnding of the microstructure approach is the distinction be-
tween two classes of market participants. The literature distinguishes be-
tween fundamentalists, who make up their price expectations on fundamen-
tal data, and chartists, who forecast by extrapolating recent trends through
technical analysis.
According to our deﬁnition of market eﬃciency, fundamentalists do not
contribute to excess volatility in contrast to chartists (often called ”noise
traders”), who exacerbate swings of the market price due to bandwagon ef-
fects. This not fully rational behavior and their noise-guided demand for risky
assets in combination with limited arbitrage is examined in Shleifer/Summers
(1990). The authors argue that this approach to ﬁnancial markets explains
more of asset price determination than the eﬃcient market paradigm.
Another result from the literature is the assumption that the heterogeneity
of expectations drives market volume or the frequency of transactions re-
spectively. We conclude that in the presence of heterogenous participants
liquidity is positively related to excess volatility. Also Frankel/Froot (1990a)
suggest that the dispersion leads to volume of trading, and that market vol-
19K¨ onigsmarck (2000) and Sarno/Taylor (2001) oﬀer a good overview. See also Lyons
(2001) and Frankel et al. (1996).
20See for example Garﬁnkel et al. (1999), Wuthe (2000) and Agenor/Montiel (1999).
11ume exacerbates excess volatility.
Lux/Marchesi (2000) ﬁnd out that outbreak of volatility occurs if the frac-
tion of agents using chart techniques surpasses a certain threshold value.
In the often-cited paper of DeLong/Shleifer/Summers/Waldmann (1990) ex-
cess price volatility in the framework of heterogenous market participants
increases with the fraction of noise traders21.
Our conclusion is that excess volatility is positively associated with market
liquidity and that the degree of misguidance generating excess volatility de-
pends on the portion of noise traders N (see the graph YNYN in ﬁgure 3.2).
There may exist markets of similar liquidity, but one attracting more spec-
ulation than the other. This means that speculation explains more of the
volume in the ﬁrst market than in the second. The curve in ﬁgure 3.2 would
lie above the other. This leads to the question, which kind of market partici-
pant dominates the market. Frankel/Froot (1990b) and Allen/Taylor (1990)
report that mainly chart techniques are used to form expectations at short
horizons, and fundamental analysis in the long run. Moreover, the predom-
inance of chartists over fundamentalists is the reason for the occurrence of
speculative bubbles.
The positive relation between volatility and volume on ﬁnancial markets
is documented by numerous researchers.22 Bessembinder/Seguin (1993) ex-
amine the volatility-volume connection in future markets. They show that
distinguishing between expected and unexpected components of the total
market volume explains more of market volatility. Unexpected volume shocks
21See page 711.
22For references see the introductions of the research papers named thereafter.
12have a larger eﬀect on price variability.
In contrast to Sarwar (2003), who suggests that information-based trading
eﬀects trading volume, Huang/Cai/Wang (2002) show that trading frequency
is consistent with information-based trading. Using daily data of NASDAQ
securities, Jones/Kaul/Lipson (1994) ﬁnd that trading volume has no infor-
mation content for price volatility. It is the number of transactions (fre-
quency) that generates volatility. No matter whether it is more trading
volume or trading frequency that drives volatility - since liquidity contains
volume and frequency, we can delineate a positive relation between excess
volatility and market liquidity. Figure 3.2 shows one possible graph.
3.3 The Total Eﬀect
In section 3.1 we have motivated the negative relation between excess volatil-
ity and market liquidity under the assumption of an eﬃcient market struc-
ture, where market participants are homogenous and behave rationally. The
only limitation is that they don’t know about the expectations of others.
That is why it takes volume to move prices to its fundamental value, and
liquidity enhances this approximation process. Section 3.2 deals with het-
erogenous market participants (fundamentalists and noise-traders). This dis-
persion not only generates high market volume but also misguides the asset
price from its intrinsic value, dependent on the degree of heterogeneity. We
argue that excess volatility must be negatively correlated with market liq-
uidity.
13In the following analysis we assume that both eﬀects overlap. A low volume
level implies that there is no much dispersion between market participants
or the asset is not interesting to speculate on. Thus, it is more the lack of
market liquidity that exacerbates volatility, whereas at a high volume level
the misguidance owing to speculative purposes dominates the eﬀect on excess
volatility. Our suggestion is that the total liquidity eﬀect on excess volatility
is the summation of the two single eﬀects. The one under an eﬃcient mar-
ket structure exists always (benchmark), overlayed by the one according to
misguidance.
The last depends on the degree of misguidance owing to the fraction of noise
traders N. Figure 3.3 shows the vertical addition of the graphs in ﬁgure 3.1
and ﬁgure 3.2. What all volatility-liquidity curves have in common indepen-
dent of the fraction of noise traders23 is that they show an U-shape with an
optimal liquidity, where excess volatility is minimized.
4 The Imposition of a Transactions Tax
Given the pattern of ﬁgure 3.3 we now want to analyze the eﬀect of a transac-
tions tax on market volume and excess volatility. One may argue like Kupiec
(1996)24 that a securities transactions tax decreases market liquidity, which
is endogenously determined, however. But just suppressing the symptom
(liquidity) and not the cause for market dysfunction can not be successive in
dampening excess volatility.
This may be correct for a lump sum tax, which does not have any deterrent
23Except for the case that N equals 0. But on most ﬁnancial markets today heterogeneity
and thus misguidance seems to be high.
























Figure 3.3: The Total Eﬀect (Z) as a Combination of the Two Eﬀects.
or substitution eﬀect. But an ad-valorem transactions tax does inﬂuence the
behavior of market participants, since it generates a lock-in eﬀect and pun-
ishes short-term investments, to which we will refer below. Thus, the tax
does not exogenously lower market liquidity but diminishes endogenously in-
centives of (speculative) trading.
The aim of this paper is to provide some evidence that a transactions tax on
highly speculative markets might lower excess volatility. On illiquid markets,
however, the tax could generate a destabilizing eﬀect. To yield an unambigu-
ous tax eﬀect we assume the pre-tax condition to the right of the minimum
in ﬁgure 3.3. This assumption is supported by the literature mentioned in
section 1, in which a transactions tax on markets with high (excess) trad-
ing volume is proposed. The authors do not claim less liquidity but excess
15trading and excess market liquidity that generate excess volatility. In diﬀer-
ent words, in these markets the liquidity eﬀect under misguidance seems to
dominate the eﬀect under an eﬃcient market structure.
The imposition of a securities transactions tax will have two eﬀects, which we
call volume eﬀect and structural eﬀect. The next three subsections deal on
these issues with the result that for small rates a transactions tax mitigates
excess volatility when trading volume is high.
4.1 The Volume Eﬀect
A securities transactions tax at a positive rate reduces volume on interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets25. This eﬀect is threefold:
First, it is the tax rate per se, which reduces market volume. But this
eﬀect will be very small, since reasonable tax rates are proposed between
0.1 per cent and 0.5 per cent. Moreover, this income eﬀect has got more of
the character of a lump sum tax and does not explain much of the excess
volatility reduction.
Second, there appears the so-called lock-in eﬀect. The imposition of a trans-
actions tax will change investor’s behavior in such a way that they will have
less of an incentive to rebalance their portfolios when faced with new infor-
mation inﬂuencing their expectations. Kupiec (1995) and Haberer (2003)
show this volume-reducing eﬀect. Kupiec concludes, that the lock-in eﬀect
25Despite an adjustment eﬀect to new tax rates in the short-run as Haberer (2003) shows
regarding portfolio choice.
16reduces the information eﬃciency of ﬁnancial market prices.
Third, an ad-valorem transactions tax discriminates against short-term in-
vestments. Frankel (1996) shows that the tax burden is inversely related to
the holding period. Thus, short-term transactions become less proﬁtable and
- dependent on the tax rate and the holding period - many of them will not
be carried out or transactions are done less frequent. By this disincentive, a
transactions tax even at a very small rate can generate enormous reduction
in market liquidity. Frankel (1996), Felix/Sau (1996) and Arestis/Sawyer
(1998) assume that a transactions tax could reduce ﬁnancial ﬂows to 70 per
cent or even 10 per cent, dependent on the tax rate up to 0.5 per cent.
All three eﬀects reduce market volume or liquidity respectively and can be
shown in ﬁgure 4.4 as a walk to the left from point P1 to point P2.
4.2 The Structural Eﬀect
Beside its eﬀect on market liquidity, a transactions tax might change the mar-
ket microstructure. As already stated above, Frankel (1996) shows that the
transactions tax discriminates against short-term investments. Frankel/Froot
(1990b) and Allen/Taylor (1990) suggest that at short horizons market par-
ticipants tend to use extrapolating forecast techniques, while in the long-run
forecasts are based on fundamentals. Thus, a transactions tax will be more
burdensome to chartists and therefore will crowd out destabilizing specula-
tors.
As a result, more weight is put to stabilizing fundamentalists by the tax levy,
making the market structure more eﬃcient. The portion of noise traders in
17the market shrinks (smaller N) mitigating the level of misguidance. Even
Kupiec (1996), one of the critics of a securities transactions tax, suggests
that such a tax might have the potential to reduce excess price volatility26.
This is exactly what Westerhoﬀ (2003) ﬁnds out. He examines the eﬀect
of a Tobin Tax when implied in a simulation model with chartists and fun-
damentalists on the foreign exchange market. He shows that the imposition
of the tax ﬁrst crowds out chartism, and therefore stabilizes the market.
Palley (1999) detects some negative externality of noise traders on fundamen-
talists. He shows that a transactions tax can internalize this externality and
thus makes the market structure more eﬃcient. The eﬀect of a transactions
tax on speculative bubbles is examined by Menkhoﬀ/Michaelis (1993). They
ﬁnd out that the tax has the potential to prevent bubbles from emerging,
and makes the bubble burst earlier.
But one may argue that taxation aﬀects all types of traders. Also stabilizing
fundamentalists will be crowded out of the market, if tax rates are too high.
The result would be a price disconnection from fundamental value. However,
these misalignments will be small at low tax rates and increase with higher
rates, because fundamentalists seem to trade less frequently (long horizon)
than chartists (short horizon).
We conclude that for small tax rates the imposition of a transactions tax
improves the market microstructure, so that for every given liquidity ex-
cess volatility is below the non tax case. The ﬁndings of Westerhoﬀ (2003)
support this assumption. ”By imposing a small transactions tax, the prof-























Figure 4.4: The Imposition of a Transactions Tax.
itability of trading declines and speculators leave the market. [..] If the tax
rate exceeds a critical value, deviations of exchange rates from fundamentals
start to rise.”27 He shows that a tax below around 0.5 per cent improves the
market structure by crowding out chartism more than fundamentalism. At
higher tax rates misalignment increases. The structural eﬀect is shown in
ﬁgure 4.4 by a downward shift (broken line), represented by the move from
point P2 to point P3 on the new curve Z0Z0.
4.3 The Total Tax Eﬀect
The total tax eﬀect consists of both, the volume eﬀect and the structural
eﬀect. It can be shown as the move from point P1 to point P3 in ﬁgure 4.4.
27Westerhoﬀ (2003), page 69.
19Since in our example the volume eﬀect reduces excess volatility and so does
the structural eﬀect, the overall eﬀect is unambiguous. This holds for highly
speculative markets with high trading volume and a small tax rate. However,
illiquid markets (P1 to the left of the minimum) run the risk of being more
volatile after taxation. The same happens when a high tax rate makes the
market illiquid. In both cases P3 could lie above P1, which means that a
transactions tax might increase excess volatility.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper oﬀers some evidence from the literature that a securities transac-
tions tax on international ﬁnancial markets could lower excess market volatil-
ity, provided that taxed transactions take place in highly speculative markets
with high trading volume and tax rates are small. Otherwise the tax levy
might increase excess volatility.
First, we detect a liquidity eﬀect. Liquidity under eﬃcient market struc-
ture enhances the price adjustment to new fundamental equilibrium, thus
negatively related to excess volatility. Second, under misguidance due to
speculative noise-trading and chartism oriented on the short-horizon, liquid-
ity aggravate market eﬃciency. We conclude that there must be an optimal
liquidity, which minimizes excess volatility.
The imposition of a transactions tax generates two eﬀects. The volume-
reducing eﬀect decreases excess volatility only when the pre-tax case is situ-
ated on the right hand side of the minimum. There is strong evidence that
20the structural eﬀect enhances the functioning of international ﬁnancial mar-
kets, therefore reducing excess volatility as well. Then, the total tax eﬀect is
unambiguous.
To sum up the assumptions and conclusions we have made to derive these
results:
- Liquidity enhances price adjustment when the market structure is eﬃcient,
and worsens price adjustment when herd behavior and bandwagon eﬀects are
prevalent.
- We assumed speciﬁc shapes of the two curves in ﬁgure 3.1 and ﬁgure 3.2,
which meet the deduced requirements.
- The observed supereﬃcient ﬁnancial market suﬀers from excess trading vol-
ume (on the right hand side of the minimum).
- We analyze tax eﬀects when tax rates are small (below 0.5 per cent).
- At small tax rates, positive structural eﬀects caused by the crowding out of
speculative and destabilizing market participants exceed misalignments due
to price disconnection and crowding out of fundamental traders.
It seems to be true for many international ﬁnancial markets that speculation
generates excessive volume and excessive volatility. But there may be some
illiquid non-speculative markets. Since a transactions tax is an instrument,
which does not distinguish between assets of liquid and illiquid markets, the
tax levy could increase excess volatility in some ﬁnancial markets. Moreover,
taxation generates a price distortion through a fall in the asset’s price as
agents discount the future tax liability associated with risky asset ownership
(Kupiec 1995).
21What our analysis does not examine is the eﬃciency according to all of
Tobin’s eﬃciency concepts and the costs of taxation. First, desirable for-
eign exchange transactions owing to international trade will be taxed, too.
Second, the lock-in eﬀect does not only lead to reduced market volume but
also raises market risks, since portfolios are not fully adjusted to new cir-
cumstances. Moreover, the passing of unwanted positions from dealer to
dealer following an initial customer foreign exchange order - the so-called
hot potato trading - would face a high tax burden, since many transactions
are executed. Reducing hot potato trading would raise market risks, too
(Lyons 1997). Third, Kupiec (1996) ﬁnds that the return volatility might
increase when a securities transactions tax is imposed.
In addition, our paper does not oﬀer any evidence that a Tobin Tax on
foreign exchange transactions is an eﬀective instrument to mitigate the neg-
ative consequences of globalization.
Our argumentation is based on separate ﬁndings of the literature. In or-
der to weigh up the eﬀects, which are deduced in this work, one needs a
general equilibrium model with heterogenous traders, dynamic adjustment,
and transactions taxes. Further research would be ﬁnding such a model that
incorporates these eﬀects.
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